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Peter W. Hogg* 
I. EQUALITY IN THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS 
Section 15 of the Charter of Rights is the primary guarantee of equality1 in 
the Charter. Subsection (1) of section 15 provides as follows: 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
Section 15 did not come into force until April 17, 1985, three years later than 
the rest of the Charter of Rights.2 This delay, which was intended to allow time 
for the legislative bodies to review their statutes and cleanse them of discrimi-
natory provisions, meant that cases arising in the first three years of the life of 
the Charter could not make use of section 15. We shall see that this delay 
caused the Supreme Court of Canada to look to freedom of religion rather than 
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  This is a revised version of a paper under the same title that was presented at the Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé International Conference in Quebec City on March 22-23, 2003, and which will 
be published in the proceedings of that conference. Permission has been given for the publication of 
this version in the Supreme Court Law Review with the other papers of the 2002 Constitutional 
Cases Conference. 
*
  University Professor and Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I 
gratefully acknowledge the contribution of research assistance and ideas by Cara Zwibel, class of 
2004, the useful discussion at a faculty seminar at the Osgoode Hall Law School on August 14, 
2002, when I presented the first draft of this paper, and the helpful comments by my colleagues, 
Bruce Ryder and Daved Muttart. 
1
  Section 15 is supplemented by s. 27 (multicultural heritage) and s. 28 (sexual equality). 
2
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, sub. 32(2). 
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to section 15 in order to decide the Sunday closing cases that came up during 
this intervening period.3 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in interpreting section 15, has imposed two 
important restrictions on the scope of its apparently broad language.4 First, 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia5 held that section 15 did not pro-
hibit all distinctions made in statutes but only those based on the listed grounds 
or grounds analogous to the listed grounds. While the Court has not been very 
clear about the characteristics of analogous grounds, such grounds must bear 
some important similarity to the listed grounds, and this excludes many statu-
tory distinctions from section 15 review. An important exclusion is occupation, 
which is a freely chosen status, unlike the generally immutable listed grounds 
of discrimination, and so laws that draw distinctions between persons in differ-
ent occupations are not subject to section 15 review.6 We shall see that this 
particular exclusion has led the Court to look to section 2(d) (freedom of asso-
ciation) rather than section 15 in reviewing the exclusion of agricultural work-
ers from Ontario’s labour relations law.7 Another important exclusion is place 
of residence, which is also a freely chosen status that does not qualify as an 
analogous ground, and so laws that draw distinctions between persons in differ-
ent parts of the country or different parts of a province are not subject to section 
15 review.8 We shall see that this particular exclusion has led the Court to look 
to section 3 (the right to vote) rather than section 15 in reviewing discrepancies 
in the size of electoral ridings in Saskatchewan.9 
The second important restriction on section 15 was announced by the Su-
preme Court of Canada in Law v. Canada.10 In the Law case, the Court held that 
a law that imposed a distinction on a listed or analogous ground was subject to 
section 15 review only if the law also impaired “human dignity.” This vague 
concept was not defined, although the Court identified a series of “contextual 
factors” to help in identifying breaches of human dignity. This new requirement 
has the effect of further narrowing the class of legislative distinctions that are 
prohibited by section 15. In that case, for example, a distinction based on age (a 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  See text under heading III. “Freedom of Religion,” below. 
4
  Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 4th ed., looseleaf (1992), ch. 52, attempts a compre-
hensive account of the case law. 
5
  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
6
  For example, Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, at para. 
44 (membership of police force not analogous ground; therefore, no s. 15 review of exclusion of 
police force from collective bargaining statute). 
7
  See text under heading IV. “Freedom of Association,” below. 
8
  The caselaw is described in Hogg, supra, note 4, heading 52.16, “Place of residence.”  
9
  See text under heading V. “Right to Vote,” below. 
10
  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. 
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listed ground) in the Canada Pension Plan11 was upheld because those persons 
who were denied benefits because of their age had not, so the Court held, had 
their human dignity impaired. A similar decision was reached in Gosselin v. 
Quebec (Attorney General),12 where the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a 
Quebec welfare scheme that paid lower benefits to persons under 30 unless 
they participated in stipulated educational or work programs, in which case 
higher benefits were payable. Persons over 30 received the higher benefits 
automatically without the requirement of participation in educational or work 
programs. Although this regime relied on a distinction based on age, it was 
upheld because the recipients under 30, who were subject to the more stringent 
regime, had not, according to the Court, had their dignity impaired.  
All of the rights in the Charter are subject to section 1 of the Charter; that is 
to say, the rights are subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The Supreme Court 
of Canada in R. v. Oakes13 and subsequent cases has developed an elaborate set 
of standards for the determination of whether a law is justified under section 1. 
A law that infringes section 15 of the Charter will be upheld if the Oakes stan-
dards are met. For example, mandatory retirement is a law that was held to 
infringe section 15 but was upheld under section 1.14 But of course one never 
reaches section 1 unless there has been a breach of a guaranteed right, and so 
laws that do not employ a listed or analogous ground of distinction, or that do 
not impair human dignity, are upheld without recourse to section 1.  
While the Supreme Court of Canada with its right hand has been building the 
elaborate structure of interpretation of section 15 (and section 1), with its left 
hand it has been finding ways of applying an equality “value” that is liberated 
from the restrictions on section 15. The purpose of this paper is to examine this 
phenomenon. We shall see that there are cases where other Charter rights do 
the work of the equality guarantee, including the interesting cases where sec-
tion 15 is not available, either because it was not in force, or because the re-
quirement of an analogous ground or human dignity would bar any remedy 
under section 15. We shall see that a claim that an equality right has been 
breached can sometimes be upheld under the aegis of another Charter right (the 
freedoms of association and religion and the right to vote will provide our 
clearest examples), because that other Charter right contains within it an equal-
ity component that is not restricted in the same way as section 15. 
                                                                                                                                                              
11
  Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8. 
12
  2002 SCC 84. 
13
  [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; for commentary, see Hogg, supra, note 4, ch. 35.  
14
  McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229. 
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We shall also see that when an individual asserts a Charter right the Court 
will sometimes recognize the equality rights of others as part of the context in 
which the claim must be assessed. Freedom of expression, for example, is 
occasionally invoked to protect hateful messages that come into conflict with 
the equality rights of women, children, or minority groups. And the right to full 
answer and defence of a person accused of sexual assault is occasionally in-
voked to justify invasive inquiries into the past sexual history of complainants, 
which brings the right into conflict with the rights of privacy and equality. In 
these cases, the Court has been attentive to the equality value, despite the fact 
that it is asserted in opposition to the person who is actually asserting his or her 
Charter right.  
Before elaborating the points made in the previous two paragraphs, a brief 
explanation of Charter values is needed. 
II. CHARTER VALUES 
The concept of “Charter values” has been invented by the Supreme Court of 
Canada to mitigate the fact that the Charter of Rights applies only to govern-
mental action. Although governmental action is a broad concept, it still leaves a 
sphere of private action that is not constrained by the Charter. The exclusion of 
private action entails the exclusion of that part of the common law (of contract, 
tort, and property, for example) that regulates the actions of private persons and 
organizations. But when the Court has been confronted with a plausible claim 
that the common law offends the Charter the Court has not been able to bring 
itself to say simply “too bad, go and talk to the Legislature.” In the leading case 
of Dolphin Delivery,15 which was a labour dispute between private parties, 
McIntyre J. for the majority of the Court said that the common law can be 
modified by the Court in order to bring it into line with “the fundamental values 
enshrined in the Constitution.” Thus the concept of Charter values was born. 
While the Charter does not directly apply to the common law, the common law 
should respect Charter values and will in appropriate cases be amended so that 
it does respect Charter values. And, in reliance on this doctrine, a number of 
common law rules have in fact been modified, so that in practice there is not a 
great deal of difference between the direct application of the Charter to statute 
law and the indirect application of the Charter to the common law.16  
Every Charter right is probably also a Charter value, but the latter is stated at 
a higher level of generality, without the detail that the Court has carefully en-
                                                                                                                                                              
15
  R.W.D.S.U., Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 603. 
16
  Hogg, supra, note 4, ch. 34, Application of Charter, under heading 34.2(g), “Common 
law.” 
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grafted onto the actual right, and the section 1 analysis does not follow the strict 
protocol established by the Court in Oakes but is “more flexible.”17 It is this 
broader, more flexible concept that is being used by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, not just for the purpose of developing the common law, but for the 
purpose of interpreting the Charter itself. In particular — and this is the topic of 
this paper — the Charter value of equality is being imported into the definition 
of the other Charter rights or into the section 1 analysis. In this way, what are 
really equality claims18 can be remedied under other rights without the need to 
bother with listed and analogous grounds or human dignity, the two severe 
restrictions on the direct application of section 15.19 The next sections of this 
paper explain the cases where this phenomenon has occurred. 
III. FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights guarantees “freedom of conscience and 
religion.” The first two cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada under 
section 2(a) concerned objections to Sunday closing laws by retailers.20 In my 
view, the objection to Sunday closing laws is really an equality claim. The 
retailer who observes a Saturday sabbath (for example) will suffer a competi-
tive disadvantage by closing on Saturday whether or not there is any legislation 
imposing a day of rest. The problem with Sunday closing laws is that they 
relieve the person who observes a Sunday sabbath from that competitive disad-
vantage. They do not prevent the Saturday observer from observing Saturday as 
the sabbath, nor do they compel any kind of religious observance on the Sun-
day. It is the favoured treatment of Christians, who observe a Sunday sabbath, 
                                                                                                                                                              
17
  Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at paras. 97, 98, per Cory 
J. for majority. 
18
  A more principled explanation of the cases would be that a claim to liberty or justice ines-
capably includes an implicit notion of equality. This is explicit, for example, in John Rawls’ “first 
principle of justice”: A Theory of Justice (Harvard U.P., 1971), at 60, 302; see also Ronald 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth, 1977), at 179-80; K.L. Karst, “Equality as a 
Central Principle in the First Amendment” (1975) 43 U. Chicago L. Rev. 20. 
19
  Another approach, which has so far not attracted any judicial support, is to recognize 
equality as an “unwritten constitutional principle”: P. Hughes, “Recognizing Substantive Equality 
as a Foundational Constitutional Principle” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J.  5. 
20
  Later freedom of religion cases did not address the equality value of s. 2(a). After 1985, s. 
15 could be invoked, and was invoked (as well as s. 2(a)) in Reference re Bill 30, Act to Amend 
Education Act (sub nom. Reference re Act to Amend Education Act (Ontario)) (Ontario Separate 
School Funding), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, and Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, to challenge the 
failure to fund religious schools other than Roman Catholic separate schools in Ontario; this 
challenge was defeated by the special constitutional status of Roman Catholic separate schools in 
Ontario.  
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over non-Christians who observe other sabbaths, that provides the force of the 
constitutional argument. Since “religion” is one of the listed grounds of dis-
crimination in section 15, it would seem that Sunday closing would fall on the 
sword of section 15 rather than section 2(a). What happened, however, was that 
challenges were brought against the federal and Ontario statutes during the first 
three years of the life of the Charter of Rights. Since section 15 had not come 
into force in this period, section 15 was not available to the challengers. If there 
was to be a remedy it could not be under section 15. 
The first case was R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,21 which was a challenge to 
the Lord’s Day Act,22 a federal statute that prohibited most commercial activity 
on Sundays. Justice Dickson (as he then was) for the majority of the Court 
found that the purpose of the Act, which he derived from the history and terms 
of the Act, was “to compel the observance of the Christian Sabbath.”23 Such a 
purpose was not compatible with section 2(a) (and could not be justified under 
section 1). In the course of reaching this result, Dickson J. made clear that an 
equality value was part of section 2(a). He said that “A free society is one 
which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms 
and I say this without any reliance upon section 15 of the Charter.”24 And he 
went on to say that “The protection of one religion and the concomitant non-
protection of others imports disparate impact destructive of the religious free-
dom of the collectivity.”25  
The second case was R. v. Edwards Books & Art Emporium,26 which was a 
challenge to Ontario’s Retail Business Holidays Act,27 which prohibited retail 
stores from opening on Sundays. The legislative history of this Act showed that 
its purpose (unlike that of the Lord’s Day Act) was not a religious one but the 
secular one of providing a common pause day for retail workers. Nonetheless, 
the majority of the Court held that the law infringed section 2(a) because its 
effect was to impose an economic burden on those retailers who observed a 
sabbath on a day other than Sunday. That effect created a competitive pressure 
to abandon a non-Sunday sabbath, which was an abridgment of freedom of 
                                                                                                                                                              
21
  [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. The Court was unanimous. Justice Dickson (as he then was) wrote 
the opinion of the majority. Justice Wilson wrote a separate concurrence, relying on the effect 
rather than the purpose of the Act to show the breach of the Charter. 
22
  R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13. 
23
  Big M, supra, note 21, at 351. 
24
  Id., at 336. 
25
  Id., at 337. This passage was quoted by Bastarache J. in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney 
General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at para. 22.  
26
  [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713. Chief Justice Dickson wrote the majority opinion for himself and 
Chouinard and LeDain JJ. Justice Beetz wrote a concurring opinion for himself and McIntyre J. 
Justice La Forest wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Wilson wrote an opinion dissenting in part. 
27
  R.S.O. 1980, c. 453. 
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religion. In this case, the Act was upheld, because a majority of the Court held 
that the Act was justified under section 1. As argued above, in my view, the 
reasoning is really based on equality, and as in Big M, Dickson C.J.’s reasoning 
for the majority in Edwards Books draws on equality ideas, including a repeti-
tion of his dictum that “a free society is one which aims at equality with respect 
to the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms.”28  
It is interesting to speculate whether the reasoning in Big M and Edwards 
Books would have been different if section 15 had been in force when the cases 
arose such that the injustice of which the complainants alleged could have been 
directly addressed under section 15. It certainly would have affected the reason-
ing and perhaps the result for Beetz J. in Edwards Books. Justice Beetz, who 
(with the agreement of McIntyre J.) wrote a concurring opinion, denied that 
there was a breach of section 2(a); in his view, the only argument against the 
Act was an equality one and the only place to make it was under section 15, 
which was not then in force. This point was surely unanswerable, unless section 
2(a) itself has an equality component, which is what the majority opinion of 
Dickson C.J. must stand for. 
IV. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
Section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights guarantees “freedom of association.” 
This right has been rather narrowly defined by the Supreme Court of Canada; 
and in particular, the Court has held that it does not include rights to collective 
bargaining and to strike, and does not impose on government any positive 
obligations to legislate. At common law, individuals have a right to associate, 
and what section 2(d) does is prevent governments from imposing restrictions 
on the right to associate (or at least to require any restrictions to be justified 
under section 1). In Delisle v. Canada,29 the Supreme Court of Canada, in a 
majority opinion written by Bastarache J., held that the exclusion of members 
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) from the federal Public Service 
Staff Relations Act,30 which regulates labour relations in the federal public 
service, was not a breach of section 2(d). While the exclusion meant that the 
RCMP could not form a trade union and be certified under the Act, it did not 
impair their common law right to form an employee association (albeit an 
                                                                                                                                                              
28
  Edwards Books, supra, note 26, at 757.  
29
  Supra, note 6. The opinion of the majority was written by Bastarache J. with the concur-
rence of Gonthier, McLachlin and Major JJ. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé wrote a separate concurring 
opinion. Justices Cory and Iacobucci dissented, holding that the exclusion of the RCMP from the 
collective bargaining regime was a breach of freedom of association. 
30
  R.S.C. 1985, c. P-35. 
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association with no power to bargain collectively or to strike). To be sure, the 
Act placed the RCMP in a worse position than other federal employees, but this 
argument amounted to a section 15 claim that could not be invoked because the 
legislative distinction between occupational groups was not a listed or analo-
gous ground.31 
In Dunmore v. Ontario,32 the Supreme Court of Canada, with Bastarache J. 
again writing for the majority, held that the exclusion of agricultural workers 
from Ontario’s Labour Relations Act, 199533 was a breach of section 2(d) (and 
could not be saved under section 1). On the face of it, this was exactly the same 
issue as had been resolved in Delisle, but with the opposite result. How did the 
case differ from Delisle? The Court offered two reasons. One was that, unlike 
the police officers in Delisle, who had formed their own association without the 
benefit of labour relations legislation, it was not feasible for the agricultural 
workers to form an employees’ association without some assistance from the 
Legislature. The second was that, unlike the police officers in Delisle, who 
were employed by government, the agricultural workers were employed by 
private firms or individuals and could not rely on the direct application of the 
Charter to support their efforts to form an association. But surely the ratio 
decidendi of Delisle is equally applicable in Dunmore. The freedom to organize 
existed independently of any statute, and the exclusion of agricultural workers 
from the superior regime of the Labour Relations Act did not impair their free-
dom to organize. The agricultural workers were in the same position as if there 
was no Labour Relations Act. Their difficulties in forming an association 
stemmed from the inherent character of farm work and from resistance by their 
private employers, not from any action by the Legislature or government to 
which the Charter applied. This was the dissenting view of Major J., as well as 
the unanimous view of the Ontario judges at trial and in the Court of Appeal. 
The agricultural workers in Dunmore were making an equality claim. The 
legislation from which they were excluded did not diminish their common law 
right to associate, but it did give superior rights to other workers in Ontario. 
The agricultural workers asked to be treated equally with the workers to whom 
the Act did apply, and the Court said yes. Justice Bastarache said that it was 
“not necessary” to consider section 15 of the Charter, because the remedy 
could be had under section 2(d).34 With respect, that was a rather disingenu-
                                                                                                                                                              
31
  Delisle, supra, note 6, at para. 44, per Bastarache J. for majority. 
32
  Supra, note 25. Justice Bastarache wrote the opinion for the majority of seven. Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Major wrote a dissenting opinion. 
33
  S.O. 1995, c. 1. 
34
  Dunmore, supra, note 25, para. 2. Of the majority judges, only L’Heureux-Dubé J. faced 
the issue directly in her concurring opinion, in which she held (at para. 170) that occupational status 
should be accepted as an analogous ground, and that the agricultural workers were entitled to 
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ous statement because, as Major J. pointed out in dissent, it was obvious on the 
basis of the prior case law that the agricultural workers would not be able to 
satisfy the analogous ground requirement that had defeated the police officers 
in Delisle. What the Court was doing in Dunmore was importing a Charter 
value of equality into the right to freedom of association in order to avoid its 
own insistence that equality claims must be based on listed or analogous 
grounds.  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s remedy in Dunmore was to sever the provi-
sion excluding agricultural workers from the Labour Relations Act. The sever-
ance had the effect of conferring on the formerly excluded workers the rights to 
collective bargaining and to strike. This would be a truly bizarre result if it 
really were based on the right to freedom of association, because Bastarache J. 
for the majority explicitly reaffirmed the Court’s earlier holdings that freedom 
of association did not include the rights to collective bargaining and to strike.35 
Moreover, Bastarache J., in his discussion of section 1 justification, acknowl-
edged that many farms in Ontario were family owned and operated, and were 
not suitable to formal processes of decision-making; he also acknowledged that 
the seasonal character of agriculture made it peculiarly vulnerable to work 
stoppages. These characteristics of Ontario’s farm economy would justify the 
Legislature in withholding the rights to collective bargaining and to strike. The 
Court solved this problem by postponing its declaration of invalidity for 18 
months to allow the Legislature time to enact a special regime of labour law for 
agricultural workers.  
The special regime for agricultural workers would not have to include rights 
to collective bargaining and to strike, but it would have to include a “statutory 
freedom to organize” along with “protections judged essential to its meaningful 
exercise, such as freedom to assemble, to participate in the lawful activities of 
the association and to make representations, and the right to be free from inter-
ference, coercion and discrimination in the exercise of these freedoms.”36 Since 
these rights exist at common law (which must itself reflect Charter values), the 
Court apparently believes that enacting them into a statute would make them 
more likely to be exercised (even if no collective bargaining or strike rights 
could be acquired by the effort). No doubt, time will tell if the Court is right. In 
any event, the effect of importing the equality value into section 2(d) was to 
convert the Legislature’s negative duty to avoid impairing freedom of associa-
tion into a positive duty to enact a statute to facilitate the organization of agri-
                                                                                                                                                              
succeed under s. 15 as well as s. 2(d). Justice Major, dissenting, also faced the issue directly, 
arguing that s. 15 did not apply in the absence of a listed or analogous ground.  
35
  Id., at para. 17. 
36
  Id., at para. 67. 
122  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20    CRA            Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
cultural workers.37 Presumably, laws will also have to be designed and enacted 
for the other groups who are excluded from the Ontario Labour Relations Act 
and whose labour relations are now governed by the common law, namely, 
workers employed in horticulture, hunting, or trapping, and domestics em-
ployed in private homes. Given the decision in Dunmore, the equality value in 
section 2(d) demands no less.  
V. RIGHT TO VOTE 
Section 3 of the Charter of Rights guarantees to every citizen “the right to 
vote” in federal and provincial elections. In the Saskatchewan Electoral 
Boundaries Reference,38 the province of Saskatchewan directed a reference to 
the courts to determine whether the electoral boundaries for elections to the 
province’s Legislature offended section 3. The constitutional challenge was 
based on the fact that the rural and northern constituencies contained fewer 
people than the urban constituencies. This was an equality challenge. No one 
had been denied the right to vote.39 The problem was that the urban voters’ 
votes were not of equal weight to those of the rural voters. In the United States, 
where there is admittedly no equivalent to section 3 of the Charter, it has been 
held that a principle of equality of voting power is derived from the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 In Canada, however, an argu-
ment based on section 15 would almost certainly founder on the rock of 
analogous grounds, since it seems clear that place of residence (a freely chosen 
attribute) is not analogous to the grounds listed in section 15 and therefore 
cannot form the basis of an equality challenge under section 15.41  
What the Supreme Court of Canada decided in the Saskatchewan Electoral 
Boundaries Reference was that section 3 contained its own requirement of 
equality. The Court held that section 3 guaranteed a right of “effective repre-
sentation.” While a number of factors (including geography and settlement 
patterns) could properly be taken into account in designing electoral bounda-
                                                                                                                                                              
37
  Precursors of this result can be found in P.I.P.S. v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at paras. 15, 19, 26, per Cory J. dissenting; Delisle v. Canada, supra, note 6, 
para. 7, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. concurring, paras. 72, 85, per Cory and Iacobucci JJ. dissenting.  
38
  Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158. The majority 
judgment was written by McLachlin J. (as she then was) and concurred in by La Forest, Gonthier, 
Stevenson and Iacobucci JJ., and “substantially” by Sopinka J. who wrote brief concurring reasons. 
Justice Cory dissented with the agreement of Lamer C.J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
39
  Contrast Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) (2002), 168 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), 
striking down a provision disqualifying prisoners serving sentences of more than two years.  
40
  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
41
  Supra, note 8. 
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ries, “parity of voting power” was the factor of “prime importance”: the “citi-
zen whose vote is diluted” suffers from “uneven and unfair representation.”42 
The Court divided on whether Saskatchewan’s liberal allowances for popula-
tion disparities between urban and rural constituencies violated the rule of 
effective representation. Justice Cory for the dissenting minority would have 
held that each vote was not of sufficiently equal value and that section 3 was 
therefore offended. But McLachlin J. for the majority held that the factors of 
geography and settlement patterns provided a sufficient explanation for the 
inequalities in voting power to satisfy section 3; the challenge was accordingly 
rejected. None of the judges made reference to section 15, and all agreed on the 
presence of an equality value in section 3.  
VI. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION  
The freedom of expression cases do not provide any examples of an equality 
value being imported into section 2(b), which is the provision of the Charter 
that guarantees “freedom of … expression.”43 In fact, an equality claim was 
made in two cases arising out of the Charlottetown Accord, (a set of constitu-
tional proposals negotiated in 1992 and put to a referendum in which the pro-
posals were defeated). In Haig v. Canada (1993),44 the Supreme Court of 
Canada considered the situation of a person who could not vote in the referen-
dum because he did not satisfy the residency requirements. The Court acknowl-
edged that the casting of a ballot in the referendum was a means of expression, 
but held that section 2(b) did not require that everyone be consulted on a refer-
endum. The plaintiff’s exclusion could only be remedied under section 15 and 
since place of residence was not an analogous ground, no remedy was avail-
able.  
In the second case, Native Women’s Assn. of Canada v. R.,45 the Native 
Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) claimed that there was a breach of 
freedom of expression when the government funded and invited the participa-
tion of other native groups in the constitutional discussions but neither invited 
nor funded NWAC. The Court rejected the argument that section 2(b) required 
equality of treatment in the funding or consulting of native groups. The exclu-
sion of NWAC could be remedied only under section 15, and a breach of sec-
tion 15 had not been made out. 
                                                                                                                                                              
42
  Supra, note 37, at 183-84, per McLachlin J. for majority. 
43
  Cf. K.L. Karst, “Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment” (1975) 43 U. 
Chicago L. Rev. 20 (arguing that the First Amendment contains a “principle of equality”). 
44
  [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995. 
45
  [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627. 
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Contrast these two cases with the cases earlier described under freedom of 
religion, freedom of association, and the right to vote. In those three areas, 
when an equality claim could not be remedied under section 15, it was reme-
died under section 2(a) (in the cases of Big M and Edwards Books), under 
section 2(d) (in the case of Dunmore), and under section 3 (in the case of the 
Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries). It is unlikely that the striking difference 
in reasoning and result depends on any peculiar characteristic of the right to 
freedom of expression in section 2(b). It is more likely that the Court did not 
find the Haig and NWAC cases as deserving of redress as the four cases already 
mentioned. However, it would have been more helpful and consistent if the 
Court in Haig and NWAC had at least acknowledged the possibility of redress-
ing an equality claim under section 2(b).  
In all the cases considered so far, the equality value was asserted by the same 
persons as asserted the fundamental freedom, and the purpose of the assertion 
was to expand the fundamental freedom. In Dunmore, for example, the agricul-
tural workers relied on the equality value as an element of freedom of associa-
tion; and they succeeded in being added to the groups covered by the labour 
relations statute. But in a series of cases under the rubric of freedom of expres-
sion — cases dealing with hate propaganda and pornography — an equality 
value has been asserted by persons other than those who claimed the right to 
freedom of expression; and the purpose of the assertion was to narrow the 
fundamental freedom. In these cases, the equality value is an enemy rather than 
an ally of freedom of expression. 
The hate propaganda provision of the Criminal Code46 makes it an offence to 
wilfully promote hatred against “any section of the public distinguished by 
colour, race, religion or ethnic origin.” In R. v. Keegstra47 the conviction of Mr. 
Keegstra, a schoolteacher who had made anti-semitic statements to his students, 
was affirmed. Here the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide whether this 
offence violated section 2(b). One approach would be to say that section 2(b) 
should be interpreted in the light of section 15, so that freedom of expression 
would not extend to speech of which the only purpose was to promote hatred 
against vulnerable minority groups. The analogy here would be the doctrine of 
“mutual modification” that is used to interpret the categories of federal and 
provincial powers that are listed in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 
1867.48 Each head of power (trade and commerce, for example) is interpreted in 
its context and may be narrowed to accommodate an ostensibly conflicting or 
                                                                                                                                                              
46
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 318(4). 
47
  [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
48
  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
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overlapping category (property and civil rights, for example).49 The Court 
refused to take this approach to the interpretation of section 2(b), reaffirming 
instead the doctrine that freedom of expression extends to all statements, no 
matter how harmful, offensive, or worthless the content of a statement may be. 
However, the Court did not lose sight of the equality value that the Criminal 
Code offence sought to promote. The value was relevant to the section 1 in-
quiry. In assessing the importance of the objective of the limiting law, it was 
relevant to note that the promotion of the Charter value of equality was an 
important objective. And, in determining the degree of deference that was 
appropriate, it was relevant to note that speech designed to undermine the value 
of equality was far from the core of the values that the guarantee of freedom of 
expression was intended to protect. Armed with these ideas, the Court went on 
to hold — but only by the narrow majority of four to three — that the hate 
propaganda offence should be upheld under section 1.  
A similar process of reasoning was used by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
R. v. Zundel,50 where the Court had to review the “false news” provision of the 
Criminal Code, section 181, which made it an offence for a person to “wilfully 
[publish] a statement, tale or news that he knows is false and that causes or is 
likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest.” Zundel, who had pub-
lished pamphlets asserting that the Holocaust was a fraud invented by an inter-
national conspiracy of Jews, was charged under this provision. He defended the 
charge by invoking his right to freedom of expression under section 2(b). The 
Court did not shrink from its content-neutrality doctrine and held that deliberate 
lies were protected by section 2(b). This meant that, as in Keegstra, the out-
come turned on the section 1 inquiry, and, as in Keegstra, the section 1 inquiry 
divided the Court. In Zundel, however, the opposite result was reached: the 
majority held that the law could not be justified under section 1. The difference 
was caused by the fact that the false news offence was broader than the hate 
propaganda offence and could not as easily be justified as focused on the pro-
motion of equality.51 In the end, therefore, the false news offence was struck 
down and Mr. Zundel was acquitted. 
The use of section 1 to bring the equality value into the assessment of a 
claim to freedom of expression was certainly contemplated by Dickson C.J. in 
                                                                                                                                                              
49
  Hogg, supra, note 4, ch. 15, Judicial Review on Federal Grounds, under heading 15.9(b), 
“Exclusiveness.”  
50
  [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731. 
51
  A similar concern with equality pervades the pornography cases, where the speech is held 
to be constitutionally protected, but the objective of preventing harm to women and children is held 
sufficient to uphold the law under s. 1: R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Criminal Code offence of 
possessing and selling “obscene” material upheld); R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (Criminal 
Code offence of possessing “child pornography” upheld). 
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R. v. Oakes.52 In his classic elaboration of the standards to be used for section 1 
justification, he said there that the Court must be guided by the values of a free 
and democratic society, which included a “commitment to social justice and 
equality.”53 Moreover, there is the practical issue of the burden of proof. If 
section 2(b) itself was held not to protect expression that impaired the equality 
rights of others, then the person claiming the right to freedom of expression 
would be placed in the position of having to prove that his expression did not 
impair the equality rights of others. Under section 1, it is for the party support-
ing the challenged law to prove the facts needed for section 1 justification. 
These are reasons that support the Court’s ruling that the invocation of an 
equality value in opposition to a fundamental freedom should be dealt with in 
the section 1 analysis. In the next section of this paper, however, we shall see 
that this has not been the approach of the Court under section 7. In a series of 
sexual assault cases, the balancing of the right to full answer and defence (as-
serted by the accused) against the rights to privacy and equality (asserted by the 
complainants) has taken place within section 7 itself, and section 1 has played 
no role in the outcomes.  
VII. FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
Section 7 of the Charter of Rights guarantees “the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accor-
dance with the principles of fundamental justice.” The Supreme Court of Can-
ada has decided that the principles of fundamental justice include principles of 
substantive law as well as procedure, and this expansive view has not been 
reined in by anything other than extraordinarily vague definitions of fundamen-
tal justice, of which the most precise is “the basic tenets of the legal system” 
(but without any agreement on what those basic tenets are) and the least precise 
is simply a vague reference to finding “the right balance” between liberty and 
competing values.54 There is plenty of room for the equality value in this man-
sion, and rules affecting life, liberty, or security of the person that operate in an 
unequal or arbitrary way are likely to be struck down as breaches of fundamen-
tal justice.  
Unequal access to abortion from one region of the country to another was 
one of the deficiencies in Canada’s therapeutic abortion law that led to its being 
struck down under section 7 by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morgen-
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  Supra, note 13. 
53
  Id., at 136. 
54
  See Hogg, supra, note 4, heading 44.10(b) “Definition of fundamental justice.” 
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taler.55 The division of opinion in the Court in Rodriguez v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General),56 where the Court by a narrow majority of five to four 
upheld the validity of the crime of assisting suicide, really turned on equality 
issues. The dissenters were impressed by the point that the law created no 
problems for an able-bodied person who wished to take her own life (suicide 
and attempted suicide not being crimes), but the law was a grave impediment to 
a person who (like the plaintiff) was disabled and could not commit suicide 
unassisted. For the majority, an exception for disabled people would itself be an 
unacceptable inequality. And in New Brunswick (Minister of Health & Com-
munity Services) v. G. (J.),57 where the Court held that section 7 required that 
legal aid be provided to parents whose children were subject to removal pro-
ceedings, the concurring opinion of L’Heureux-Dubé J. relied on equality 
values (disproportionate effect on single women) in its reasoning.58 
In these cases, the person asserting the right to life, liberty, or security of the 
person is the person relying on the equality value to expand the scope of fun-
damental justice. However, the Supreme Court of Canada will also take account 
of the equality rights of others, even when they are in conflict with the interests 
of the person claiming the section 7 right. When that occurs, the equality value 
has the effect of narrowing the requirements of fundamental justice.  
One of the principles of fundamental justice is the right of an accused person 
to present full answer and defence. In sexual assault cases, this right can come 
into conflict with privacy and equality values asserted by complainants, who 
seek to avoid an invasive inquiry into their sexual history (on issues of consent 
and credibility). In R. v. Seaboyer,59 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada 
struck down a “rape-shield” law enacted by Parliament that limited the right of 
the defence to cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual history. 
The majority of the Court, in an opinion written by McLachlin J., acknowl-
edged the need to place limits on the cross-examination of the complainant, but 
they held that this law went too far, because it would occasionally have the 
effect of excluding evidence that was relevant to full answer and defence. The 
dissenting minority, in an opinion written by L’Heureux-Dubé J., took the view 
                                                                                                                                                              
55
  [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. All three majority judgments (Dickson C.J., Beetz J. and Wilson J.) 
were impressed by the regional inequality. Note that differences between provinces and areas of a 
province has always been rejected as an “analogous ground” in s. 15 analysis. 
56
  [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519. For the majority, Sopinka J. rejected arguments based on ss. 7 and 
15. In dissent, McLachlin J. (with L’Heureux-Dubé J.) relied on s. 7, Lamer C.J. on s. 15, and Cory 
J. on both ss. 7 and 15. 
57
  [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46.  
58
  Id., at paras. 112-14. 
59
  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. Justice McLachlin wrote the opinion for the majority of seven; 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote a dissenting opinion for herself and Gonthier J. 
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that the evidence excluded by the rape-shield provision was all either irrelevant 
or so prejudicial to the fairness of the trial that it could and should properly be 
excluded. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was particularly concerned about equality 
issues related to the prevention of violence against women, the encouragement 
to report complaints of sexual assault, and the elimination of discriminatory 
stereotypes about the effect of prior sexual activity on issues of credibility and 
consent.  
The decision in Seaboyer forced Parliament to redraft the rape-shield law, 
which it did without much change, but with a new discretion in the trial judge 
to admit evidence adjudged to be relevant and of sufficient probative value so 
as not to be outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration 
of justice. This discretion addressed the concern of the majority in Seaboyer 
while also addressing the points made by L’Heureux-Dubé J., and the revised 
law was upheld unanimously by the Court in R. v. Darrach.60 The Court held 
that it was appropriate to take into account the equality right of the complainant 
when assessing the validity under section 7 of limits on the defence’s right of 
cross-examination. Note that this assessment all took place under section 7 and 
that it was not necessary for the Court to shift into the section 1 inquiry. 
A related issue arose in R. v. O’Connor,61 where the accused, a Catholic 
Bishop, who was charged by four former students with sexual assaults alleged 
to have been committed while he was the principal of a native residential 
school, sought an order requiring disclosure of the complainants’ school, medi-
cal, and counsellors’ records. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously 
agreed that in certain circumstances the disclosure of confidential records 
would be needed to enable an accused person to make full answer and defence. 
The Court was also unanimous that a procedure had to be devised to strike a 
proper balance between the defence’s interest in full information and the com-
plainants’ interest in the privacy of confidential records, as well as the equality 
issues raised by the risk of discouraging the reporting of sexual assaults and the 
risk of prejudicial conclusions about credibility and consent being drawn from 
information about the lifestyles of the female complainants. A majority of the 
Court, in an opinion written by Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J., then devised an 
onerous procedure to be gone through before records could be disclosed. The 
minority of the Court, in an opinion written by L’Heureux-Dubé J., would have 
preferred an even more onerous procedure, making disclosure even more diffi-
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  [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443. The bench included L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ., who were the 
two dissenters in Seaboyer, and the opinion of the Court was written by Gonthier J. 
61
  [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. On the issue discussed in the text, the Court divided five to four, with 
the majority opinion being written by Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J., and the minority opinion being 
written by L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
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cult to achieve. Both the majority and the minority opinions agreed that the 
right to make full answer and defence under section 7 was not an absolute right, 
but one that must at times yield to other constitutional values, including that of 
equality.62 The disagreement was over the precise balance between the ac-
cused’s right to full answer and defence, and the values of privacy and equality. 
After the decision in O’Connor, Parliament enacted a procedure to obtain 
disclosure of confidential records of complainants in criminal cases. Parliament 
evidently thought that the procedure laid down by the majority in O’Connor 
was insufficiently protective of the complainants’ privacy and equality inter-
ests, and the new statutory procedure bore a striking resemblance to the stricter 
standards suggested in the dissenting opinion of L’Heureux-Dubé J. Not sur-
prisingly, the statutory procedure quickly faced a constitutional challenge. After 
all, under the statutory procedure some material would be withheld from the 
defence that under the majority O’Connor procedure would have to be dis-
closed. What was surprising was that the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Mills63 upheld the new statutory procedure. What was even more surprising was 
that the Court did not rely on section 1 (despite a long preamble in the legisla-
tion clearly crafted to help satisfy the Oakes standards). The Court never 
reached section 1, because in defining what was required to satisfy the princi-
ples of fundamental justice in section 7, the Court deferred to Parliament’s 
considered judgment as to the appropriate balance between the competing 
constitutional values. The Court praised the notion of a “dialogue” between the 
Court and Parliament, and noted that Parliament and the government had un-
dertaken an extensive consultation that included consideration of the opinions 
in O’Connor and of the experience of criminal courts in applying O’Connor. 
The Court concluded that, although the new statutory procedure gave more 
weight to privacy and equality than had the majority in O’Connor, the statutory 
procedure gave enough weight to the accused’s right to make full answer and 
defence to satisfy section 7. 
For present purposes, what is interesting about Mills and the other cases 
dealing with full answer and defence in sexual assault cases is the explicit 
incorporation into section 7 of the constitutional value of equality, despite the 
fact that it has the effect of narrowing the principles of fundamental justice that 
are guaranteed by section 7. This is exactly what the Court in Keegstra refused 
to do to freedom of expression when faced with legislation that limited expres-
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  Id., at paras. 31-32, per Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J., paras. 106, 120-24, per L’Heureux-
Dubé J.  
63
  [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. On the main issue, the Court was unanimous. A majority opinion 
was written by McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ. Chief Justice Lamer wrote a separate opinion dissent-
ing from only part of the majority opinion (with respect to disclosure of records in the possession of 
the Crown). 
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sion in the service of equality. The Court sees the principles of fundamental 
justice in much more qualified and pragmatic terms than freedom of expres-
sion, which must as a matter of principle (so it seems) be kept content-neutral 
and therefore very broad. Of course, as we noticed, the equality value is not lost 
in the freedom of expression cases; it is used in the section 1 analysis. From the 
point of view of the results, it may make little difference where the equality 
value is introduced into the analysis, so long as it is recognized at some point 
that is critical to the decision.64 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing account of the cases? 
One obvious conclusion is that the protection of equality in the Charter of 
Rights is not confined to section 15 and the supplementary guarantees of sec-
tion 27 (multicultural heritage) and section 28 (sexual equality). In the context 
of the fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, assembly, and association, 
laws that treat different groups unequally, even on grounds that would not 
qualify for a section 15 challenge, may be struck down on the basis of an equal-
ity value in section 2. This is also true of the right to vote in section 3 and 
probably other Charter rights as well.65 Where freedom of expression is exer-
cised to the detriment of vulnerable minorities, the equality values asserted by 
the victims will also be recognized, not by narrowing down section 2, but as 
part of the balancing of interests required for the section 1 analysis. In cases 
where life, liberty, or security of the person is engaged, so that section 7 ap-
plies, the requirements of fundamental justice are derived by a balancing of 
various interests including the value of equality. That balancing takes place 
within section 7, not within section 1. 
While not every assertion of an equality value outside section 15 has been 
successful in the Supreme Court of Canada, the success rate is high and it is 
plain from the language of the opinions that the equality value is always taken 
seriously. What is interesting about this development is that it runs in parallel 
with the Court’s efforts to cut down the scope of the explicit equality guarantee 
in section 15. The restriction to listed or analogous grounds of discrimination 
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  Theoretically, the imposition of the burden of proof on the person claiming the s. 7 right 
may give some advantage to the persons claiming the equality right. Whether this is so in practice, 
given the rather loose notions of proof that courts accept in establishing social and economic facts 
in constitutional cases, is a matter for debate or perhaps more experience. 
65
  Police practices that improperly rely on considerations of race may also offend s. 8 of the 
Charter: R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 83; or s. 9 of the Charter: D.M. Tanovich, 
“Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality-based Conception of 
Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145, at 179. 
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and the requirement of an impairment of human dignity, which are now insisted 
upon for a section 15 claim of equality, are usually not mentioned when the 
Court applies a Charter value of equality in the context of a right other than 
section 15. I speculate that there is a connection between the two contrary 
tendencies in the Court’s jurisprudence, but if that is true it is still hard to un-
derstand, since a judicial sentiment that section 15 was being hedged by too 
many restrictions could be addressed directly by loosening those restrictions or 
not imposing new ones (like human dignity).  
The effect of the decisions is to draw a distinction between laws that regulate 
the exercise of Charter rights, such as freedom of religion, freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of association, and the right to vote, and laws that regulate be-
haviour that does not implicate Charter rights. The former category is 
reviewable under the looser Charter value of equality, so that any irrational 
difference of treatment is likely to lead to invalidity. The latter category is 
reviewable under the section 15 guidelines, so that differences of treatment lead 
to invalidity only if they involve listed or analogous grounds and impair human 
dignity. Although the Court has not attempted to articulate or justify this dis-
tinction, perhaps it makes sense. To be sure, it expands equality review, but not 
to an unmanageable extent, as it would if all laws could be struck down for the 
use of irrational classifications. Only laws that have a negative effect on the 
exercise of a Charter right are subject to this heightened level of judicial scru-
tiny. Other laws are reviewable on equality grounds only if they use classifica-
tions that are based on a listed or analogous ground and impair human dignity. 
For the most part, then, the Court is still restraining itself to remedying only the 
most serious kinds of discrimination, and is not attempting to review every 
classification made by the elected Parliament or Legislature.  
 
132  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20    CRA            Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
 
Adler v. Ontario ............................................................................................................ 118 
Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia) ................................................................. 114 
Baker v. Carr ................................................................................................................ 124 
Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General) ...................................... 120, 121, 122, 123 
Dolphin Delivery .......................................................................................................... 117 
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)............................................... 121, 122, 123, 125 
Edwards Books ..................................................................................................... 119, 125 
Gosselin v. Quebec ....................................................................................................... 115 
Haig ...................................................................................................................... 124, 125 
Haig v. Canada ............................................................................................................. 124 
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto ...................................................................... 117 
Law v. Canada .............................................................................................................. 115 
McKinney v. University of Guelph ................................................................................ 115 
Native Women’s Assn. of Canada v. R. ......................................................................... 125 
New Brunswick (Minister of Health & Community Services) v. G.(J.) ......................... 129 
NWAC ........................................................................................................................... 125 
P.I.P.S. v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner) ........................................................ 123 
R. v. Big M Drug Mart .................................................................................. 118, 119, 125 
R. v. Butler .................................................................................................................... 127 
R. v. Darrach ................................................................................................................ 130 
R. v. Edwards Books & Art Emporium ......................................................................... 119 
R. v. Golden .................................................................................................................. 133 
R. v. Keegstra ............................................................................................... 126, 127, 132 
R. v. Mills .............................................................................................................. 131, 132 
R. v. Morgentaler .......................................................................................................... 128 
R. v. O’Connor ..................................................................................................... 130, 131 
R. v. Oakes ............................................................................................ 115, 117, 127, 131 
R. v. Seaboyer ....................................................................................................... 129, 130 
R. v. Sharpe .................................................................................................................. 127 
R. v. Zundel ................................................................................................................... 127 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Equality as a Charter Value 133 
 in Constitutional Interpretation 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20    CRA            Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
Reference re Bill 30, Act to Amend Education Act (sub nom. Reference re Act to Amend 
Education Act (Ontario)).......................................................................................... 118 
Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan) ................................... 123 
Reynolds v. Sims ........................................................................................................... 124 
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) ...................................................... 128 
Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries ............................................................. 123, 124, 125 
Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference .................................................... 123, 124 
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) ................................................................... 123 
 
